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Key points 
This policy brief argues that a ‘governance gap’ explains the existential crisis of the EU’s Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The true causes of the EU’s inertia as a security actor in its 
neighbourhood and beyond are not a lack of capability or even austerity measures, but the absence 
of a core group of states committed to driving integration forward. Member states are reluctant to 
set clear common strategic priorities and struggle to agree on a revision of the institutional rules. 
Their strategic cultures and interests differ significantly; they hold different visions of CSDP, and 
are unwilling to use the CSDP instruments at their disposal.  
Recommendations 
To effectively reboot the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), we suggest a roadmap 
based on four goals:  
•  SIMILARITY of strategic cultures. The EEAS should steer the development of a European 
Strategic Culture (ESC). 
•  SOLIDARITY and TRUST in common capacity-building. EU pooling and sharing should move 
beyond sub-regional clustered cooperation. The European  Defence  Agency’s (EDA) mandate 
should be extended to encourage coordination and mutual trust in defence planning. 
•  CLARITY about Europe’s strategic interests. The review process of the European Security 
Strategy should clearly define the interests CSDP needs to protect. The concept of Naval Power 
EU could be explored. 
•  UNITY, as the only alternative to strategic irrelevance. If the ‘common’ in CDSP cannot 
provide value for money, maybe a different system of governance – a defence union – could do 
so?   
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1.  Introduction 
Let us take three assumptions: i) the demand for 
security provision continues to increase in 
Europe’s fragile neighbourhood (notably 
following the ‘Arab Spring’); ii) austerity 
restrictions have hit national defence budgets 
heavily; iii) the balance of power is shifting ‘from 
the West to the rest’ and the Americans are 
pivoting eastwards. Under these circumstances, 
it is no surprise that the EU is struggling to 
establish itself as a credible and effective security 
actor. The final report of High Representative 
Catherine Ashton, released in preparation for the 
December 2013 European Council on Security 
and Defence, admits that Europe “faces rising 
security challenges within a changing strategic 
context while the financial crisis is increasingly 
affecting its security and defence capability”.1 
But these are not the true causes of CSDP inertia.  
In the run-up to the European Council, a number 
of initiatives have been launched by member 
states and think tanks to chart the future of the 
CSDP and reset its strategic priorities. 2  The 
challenge is how to reboot the CSDP after a 
period of stagnation. Despite intense 
brainstorming and the floating of a numbers of 
good ideas, 3   it is still unclear whether the 
Council will succeed in giving new impetus to 
the CSDP. The agenda outlined in Catherine 
Ashton’s report includes a long list of strategic 
objectives and concrete initiatives, yet two core 
deliverables are left out: the prioritisation of 
those strategic goals, in other words the 
definition of ‘what matters for Europe’ and the 
ways in which member states’ commitment to an 
                                                      
1   “Preparing the December 2013 European Council on 
Security and Defence”, Final Report by the High 
Representative/HEAD of the EDA on the Common 
Security and Defence Policy, Brussels, 15 October 2013, p. 2 
(http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2013/131015_02_
en.pdf).  
2  See, for instance, the European Global Strategy (EGS) 
process; the November 15th 2012 Paris Declaration of the 
Foreign Affairs Ministers and Ministers of Defence of 
France, Germany, Poland and Spain; or the Italian non-
paper “More Europe”.  
3   Such as the concept of “strategic neighbourhood” 
included in the EGS Full Report, p. 3 
(http://www.europeanglobalstrategy.eu/nyheter/116470). 
integrated European defence can be bolstered, 
relating to ‘why Europe matters’.  
This policy brief argues that the combination of 
poor strategic planning and low commitment 
reveal a ‘governance gap’ that ultimately 
undermines CSDP. A governance gap can be 
defined as a situation in which the actors 
(member states, institutional bodies) have not 
been conferred or are reluctant to assume the 
authority to shape the rules of the game and set 
strategic priorities. As long as the governance 
gap remains, the existential crisis of the CSDP 
will continue. 
The next sections analyse the responses to this 
CSDP crisis and demonstrate that the lack of a 
core of committed member states, rather than 
capabilities or exogenous changes, has been the 
cause of poor performance. 4  The last section 
formulates recommendations to address the 
governance gap in the follow-up process of the 
European Council.   
2.  An existential crisis defined 
Since the end of the Cold War, the EU’s security 
and defence policy has developed through three 
phases, spelled out by Jolyon Howorth 5 , as 
follows:  
1)  the European Security and Defence Identity 
(ESDI) (1994-1998), characterised by the 
recognition of the EU’s incapacity to deal 
with the Balkan crises;  
2)  the introduction of the objective of European 
military autonomy at Saint Malo (1998) and 
the experimentation, throughout the first 
decade of this century, of the European 
Union’s security ‘actorness’ by means of new 
institutions and decision-making procedures, 
common capacity-building and the 
deployment of crisis management missions;  
                                                      
4  The present analysis leaves aside an assessment of the 
CSDP institutional set-up (e.g. the EEAS), which also affects 
the governance gap. 
5 L. Simon, “Interview with Jolyon Howorth”, in European 
Geostrategy, 4 September 2012 
(http://europeangeostrategy.ideasoneurope.eu/2012/09/ 
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3)  since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty 
(1 December 2009), a period of ‘existential 
crisis’ has marked CSDP operations, 
demonstrated by the debacle in Libya in 2011 
and exacerbated by three factors: American 
disengagement from Europe and the ’pivot 
eastwards’, the eurozone crisis and doubts 
about the future of the European project.6  
During this third phase of the crisis, the Union’s 
performance in crisis management missions has 
been poor. In an increasingly unstable 
neighbourhood, particularly in the Middle East 
and North Africa, CSDP deployments have 
decreased in the four years following the entry 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty.7  
The lessons from Libya, Mali and Syria show 
that the EU is politically and militarily impotent 
whenever a response to a major crisis is needed 
and the deployment of large-scale, high-intensity 
operations is called for. The table below shows 
the positions of France, the UK and Germany 
towards four major military interventions (Iraq 
2003, Libya 2011, Mali 2013, Syria 2013; the latter 
considered in terms of willingness to launch an 
operation had Assad refused to cooperate with 
UN inspections). The results speak for 
themselves as to the EU’s inability to build a 
united front when the use of force is required.  
Figure 1. EU’s ‘BIG 3’ (France, UK, Germany) 
involvement in major crises  
  FRANCE  UK  GERMANY 
IRAQ 2003  No  Yes  No 
LIBYA 2011  Yes  Yes  No 




Yes  No  No 
Against this backdrop, use of ’coalitions of the 
willing’ has become a trend, at the expense of 
CSDP. In fact, while on the one hand these 
                                                      
6 Cf. also J. Howorth (2012), “CSDP and NATO Post-Libya: 
Towards the Rubicon?”, Egmont Security Policy Brief No. 
35, July 2012, p. 3.  
7 For an analysis of CSDP deployments since 2009, see G. 
Faleg and S. Blockmans (2012), “The EU’s re-engagement as 
a security actor: Fresh start or still sleepwalking?”, CEPS 
Commentary, July.  
coalitions make it easier to reach consensus and 
become operational, they also allow the use of 
NATO assets outside the Berlin Plus framework, 
hence bypassing EU involvement. As long as 
European states keep on sidelining the EU in the 
response to crises, their ability to learn and 
develop common strategic planning and 
capacity-building also decreases.  
Responses to the existential crisis of CSDP in 
recent years have come in three forms:  
1)  a re-engagement in crisis management 
missions, with the emergence of a clear 
strategic focus on the Sahel and the Horn of 
Africa to strengthen conflict prevention and 
counter-piracy efforts;   
2)  the launch of new pooling and sharing 
initiatives sponsored by the European 
Defence Agency (EDA) under the Ghent 
framework;  
3)  the two European Commission’s Directives 
(43/EC in late 2008 and 81/EC in early 2009) 
to simplify procedures for moving military 
goods among member states and increasing 
the amount of defence procurement open to 
competition across the EU.  
These responses constitute the blueprint for the 
December European Council’s agenda and, 
presumably, the defence roadmap that is to 
uplift CSDP and usher in a new phase of security 
and defence integration. However, as the next 
section shows, diagnostic errors lead to incorrect 
treatment.  
3.  In search of the right diagnosis 
Preparations for the December European 
Council have created high expectations. The 
Ashton report includes ambitious 
recommendations on key deliverables for the 
summit, namely the setting of strategic priorities 
to enhance operational effectiveness; the launch of 
flagship capability projects (through pooling and 
sharing), and the creation of a European defence 
market. 
Critics of the report contend that the agenda fails 
to specify important factors. Some of them 
include a strategic narrative for Europe's role as 
a security provider; the level of ambition 4 | GIOVANNI FALEG 
 
defining what means should be committed to 
attain strategic goals and the role of EDA as 
guarantor of convergence in defence planning. 
As the European Council session approaches, 
there is growing concern in the expert 
community that the Heads of State and Heads of 
Government may not live up to expectations and 
that member states may fail to ensure the 
implementation and the follow-up process. 
Scepticism is justified. The brainstorming debate 
over the revision of the European security 
strategy has exposed fundamental divisions 
among member states; the same divisions that 
blocked an EU response to major crises, such as 
the interventions on Libya and Mali, or a strong 
common position towards Syria. As a matter of 
fact, the European Council is not in a position to 
open that Pandora's Box with so little guarantee 
of reaching a common – or meaningless – 
position. At the same time, the absence of 
strategic thinking could condemn the EU to 
irrelevance on the international stage.8 
As a recent COST-GRIP-CEPS publication 
shows, member states want different things from 
CSDP and advance their national interests in 
significantly different ways. Despite the 
existence of some common denominators, 9 
states, particularly the ‘Big 3’, fundamentally 
disagree on the willingness to use military force, 
originating in their strategic cultures; and on the 
expectations towards the role of CSDP in the 
broader European integration process, which 
essentially defines their vision of European 
security and defence.  
                                                      
8  See J. Howorth (2013), “The December 2013 European 
Council on Defence: Avoiding Irrelevance”, e-International 
Relations, 15 October.  
9   The COST-GRIP-CEPS study identifies the following 
common denominators: i) geographic priorities, namely the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA), the Sahel, the Horn 
of Africa, the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe, 
corresponding more or less to the EGS’ report definition of 
“strategic neighbourhood” (cf. note above); ii) thematic 
priorities, namely democracy, human rights and the rule of 
law; iii) partnerships with international organisations (UN 
and NATO); iv) strategic resources, such as the need to 
secure maritime routes and access to the natural resources 
of the Arctic. Cf. F. Santopinto and M. Price (eds) (2013), 
National Visions of EU Defence Policy: Common Denominators 
and Misunderstandings, COST, GRIP, CEPS, Brussels, p. 157.  
The first point of disagreement is not only the 
result of the lack of a common strategic culture.10 
Strategy-making in Europe today shows a 
dangerous lack of clarity and method in the way 
member states define their strategic interests.11 
Since national strategic documents are abstract 
and ambiguous, a constructive debate on 
European defence integration is struggling to 
emerge. Furthermore, those states traditionally 
willing and able to use military force when 
required are increasingly reluctant to use the 
CSDP as a multilateral framework for 
intervention in large-scale crises. France's ‘enter 
first’ and the UK’s exclusive bilateralism are an 
example of that. 12   The British approach has 
evolved from integrative milestones to 
remarkable steps back (see below). France’s 
national interest overshadows the European 
dimension in France’s security policy, especially 
when the EU proves sluggish and impractical in 
crisis response, as in the cases of Libya and Mali. 
Neither Sarkozy nor Hollande have been willing 
to take on responsibility or a leading role in 
defence integration.  
The second point indicates that while some of 
the member states (Italy, Germany, France, 
Spain) still conceive of a stronger CSDP as a 
means to achieve the broader goal of EU political 
integration, other countries, in particular the 
Nordics, Poland and the UK, are more inclined 
to pursue their national agendas through the 
CSDP, with less focus on the final destination of 
integration.13 
Recent proposals for an upgrade of the CSDP 
have thus fallen short of constructive debate 
about the basic rules of the game, on the 
construction of a European strategic discourse, 
as well as on the actors' commitment to agree on 
                                                      
10  See C. Meyer (2006), The Quest for a European Strategic 
Culture: Changing Norms on Security and Defence in the 
European Union, Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan.  
11 See M. Muniz (2013), “Strategy and Its Role in the Future 
of European Defence Integration”, IAI Working Paper No. 
13:30, October.  
12 Cf. chapters by Manuel Muniz on France (“France: The 
Frustrated Leader”), and by Giovanni Faleg on Italy 
(“Italy’s Third Way to European Defence”), in Santopinto & 
Price (2013).  
13 Santopinto & Price (2013), p. 161.  THE GOVERNANCE GAP IN EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE | 5 
 
these basic rules. This deficit can be defined as a 
‘governance gap’. The gap reveals the lack of a 
strong core of states driving integration forward 
as well as the absence of an agreement on a 
model of governance that would satisfy common 
operational requirements (effectiveness) and 
national interests (unity). A core is defined as a 
group of like-minded member states committed 
to deepening functional integration among 
themselves. They hold the political leverage and 
material (e.g. financial, natural) resources to 
pave the way for the processes of 
Europeanisation that affect other member states’ 
preferences. 14   CSDP is currently lacking that 
core, without which governance dynamics 
cannot steer policy evolution or initiate serious 
strategic debate. The deficiencies of Permanent 
Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the 
Battlegroups and the UK's role in CSDP are three 
cases in point.  
Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, 
PESCO allows a group of willing member states 
to deepen cooperation in security and defence, 
within the Treaty’s legal framework and making 
use of the existing institutional structures. The 
mechanism is specifically designed to foster 
pooling and sharing of resources/capabilities 
and facilitate the coordination of defence 
planning processes, with the aim of harmonising 
national defence efforts. However, while many 
experts have emphasised PESCO’s added value 
for military integration,15  no member state has 
thus far championed its activation. The debate 
has instead entered a stalemate, despite the 
apparently strong incentives to deepen 
cooperation to cope with the austerity measures 
that have hit defence budgets. 
Since 2007, the Battlegroups provide the Union 
with multinational stand-by military forces of 
1500 soldiers ready to be deployed in response to 
a crisis. Member states send soldiers following a 
                                                      
14 N. Tocci and G. Faleg (2013), “Towards a More United 
and Effective Europe: A Framework of Analysis”, 
Imagining Europe Series No. 1, Istituto Affari 
Internazionali, October, p. 11.  
15 See S. Biscop (2011), “Permanent Structured Cooperation: 
Building Effective European Armed Forces”, Paper 
presented at the 12th EUSA Biennial Conference, Boston, 3-5 
March.  
half-year rotation. As rapid intervention teams, 
their task is to intervene in high intensity 
situations and prepare the ground for long-term, 
stabilisation missions. Quick deployment, 
however, does not mean quick decisions, let 
alone political willingness. As in the case of 
PESCO, no champion of the use of Battlegroups 
has emerged, showing that a lack of 
commitment, rather than capability, is 
preventing the EU from acting globally as a 
security provider.16  
The role of the UK as one of the engines of 
European defence integration offers another 
interesting example. CSDP would not have come 
into being without British commitment at Saint 
Malo. At the same time, the British approach to 
European defence has experienced a shift from 
the Labour government’s assertiveness to a 
return of exclusive bilateralism with selected 
worthy partners (e.g. France)17  and a growing 
malign neglect vis-à-vis the EU. The British 
quasi-withdrawal has slowed down CSDP, with 
significant operational implications. The 
intervention in Libya for the first time saw the 
use of the NATO command structure by an ad 
hoc coalition (the ‘Paris-London Plus’) rather 
than under the Berlin Plus agreement for a 
Europe-driven operation.18 The  characterisation 
of the UK as ‘the elephant in the room’ of CSDP 
makes it difficult to predict Europe’s future as a 
security provider. Given that it would not be in 
the UK’s interest to quit, its reluctance to commit 
to deeper CSDP integration would nonetheless 
block any future collective European effort.  
Without core member states being committed to 
setting out the strategic rules of the game, the 
scenarios for CSDP are grim.  
                                                      
16  Jan Techau speaks about “Battlegroups’ state of coma” 
(see http://www.dw.de/eu-common-defense-strategy-
still-long-way-off/a-17238185).   
17  Cf. the signature of the Lancaster House Treaties for 
defence and security cooperation on 2 November 2010, by 
President Sarkozy and Prime Minister Cameron. 
18 S. Biscop (2012), “The UK and European defence: leading 
or leaving?”, International Affairs, 88:6, p. 1311.  6 | GIOVANNI FALEG 
 
4.  Recommendations 
While the main deliverables of the December 
European Council on Security and Defence focus 
on the CSDP infrastructure (capabilities and 
industry), it is paramount that the follow-up 
process considers ways to enhance the system of 
governance that are designed to control it. 
Closing the governance gap is not on the 
European Council’s agenda, however. The main 
deliverables for the summit have to do with the 
‘hardware’, through a relaunch of the CSDP 
infrastructure composed of capabilities and 
industry,19 in order to achieve better operational 
effectiveness. Although an agreement on 
improvements in the hardware may contribute 
to a more capable EU, it may just not be enough 
to ensure its relevance on the international stage.   
What is missing on the agenda is a new ‘system 
software’ designed to operate and control that 
hardware. It is therefore paramount that, in 
addition to the implementation of the European 
Council’s guidelines as indicated in the interim 
report, the follow-up process takes into account 
three goals, and related actions, to improve 
CSDP governance. The goals are:  
Similarity 
A major obstacle to defence integration is 
differences in strategic culture. Member states’ 
attitudes towards the use of force struggle to 
converge. Institutional structures (e.g. the EEAS) 
are created to foster convergence, through 
socialisation and Europeanisation processes. The 
EEAS should receive an explicit mandate to 
forge a European Strategic Culture (ESC), and be 
given the instruments to fulfil this task. An EU 
handbook on strategy-making could be issue to 
explore common methodologies shaping the 
emergence of European strategic thinking. 
Increased similarity in European strategic 
cultures must become a goal, not a justification 
                                                      
19  According to Linnekamp and Molling, debate on the 
hardware should lead to a European defence review that 
would bolster the European Defence Agency and agree on a 
small number of bold and realistic flagship projects. Cf. H. 
Linnenkamp and C. Molling (2013), “A Doable Agenda for 
the European Defence Council 2013”, SWP Comments No. 
28, August.  
for a set of pooled, yet separable or cluster-based 
models of cooperation.  
Solidarity and trust 
Another obstacle to integration, and to 
cooperation in general, is a lack of trust. As 
defence integration inevitably entails a loss of 
sovereignty, states are afraid of partners’ 
cheating, free-riding or unreliable behaviour. 
This is particularly relevant in the case of 
pooling and sharing of military capabilities or 
joint procurement programmes. While the 
emergence of sub-regional clusters of like-
minded countries, or “islands of cooperation”20 
is one answer to this problem, it may forestall 
future integrative efforts and produce a 
‘spaghetti bowl’ defence architecture. The EDA 
should therefore engage in confidence-building 
and promote inter-cluster cooperation, for 
instance through creating interdependency 
between countries that have a different sense of 
identity, such as northern and southern 
European member states. In this regard, EDA 
should become the guarantor of trust in common 
capacity-building by providing stronger impetus 
to achieve convergence among national defence 
planning processes. It should also develop a 
framework for the definition of directions, 
priorities and binding rules. With a mandate 
similar to the European Monetary Institute (EMI) 
before the creation of the European Central 
Bank, EDA’s tasks should be extended to 
encourage coordination in defence planning, 
with the aim to increase mutual trust across 
regional clusters.     
Clarity 
Member states are ambivalent in their intentions 
and in their strategic interests.21 So is the EU. In a 
world that is changing fast, a review of the 2003 
Solana Doctrine (the European Security Strategy) 
is a prime concern. However, neither the EU nor 
its member states can afford to produce a 
shopping list, or have an ‘apple pie’-style global 
                                                      
20 T. Valasek (2011), “Surviving austerity: the case for a new 
approach to EU military collaboration”, Centre for 
European Reform, April, p. 29.  
21 Muniz (2013).  THE GOVERNANCE GAP IN EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE | 7 
 
strategy. 22   A review of the security strategy 
should therefore be crystal clear as to what 
interests CSDP should protect, with what means 
and level of ambition, and define attainable 
long-term scenarios for a more secure European 
Union in a peaceful multi-polar world. In this 
regard, the geographical areas where security 
provision is needed (the Mediterranean, the 
Horn of Africa), the increasing operational 
importance of maritime security for CSDP23 (cf. 
EUNAVFOR Atalanta) and the prospects of a 
capability-driven consolidation of the EU naval 
industry 24  create a window of opportunity: a 
focus on the strategic value of the concept of EU 
naval power could be explored. It is also 
important that the review process follows the 
adoption of the handbook on strategy- making 
and be steered by the EEAS’ corporate board.  
Unity 
Last, but not least, providing new impetus to 
CSDP cannot go without a reassessment of what 
CSDP means within the broader EU integration 
project. We have come to a point where a ‘less 
than supranational, more than 
intergovernmental’ CSDP is of little use, if not 
counterproductive, due to complex bureaucratic 
mechanisms. As the collapse of CSDP is not 
foreseeable (it would weaken member states’ 
defence and lessen their security), the goal of a 
European Defence Union may just be what 
Europe needs under the present historical 
circumstances, and perhaps the only way to 
close the governance gap. The only alternative to 
disintegration and strategic irrelevance is a new 
system of governance resulting from deeper 
integration. If a common policy is too expensive 
and ineffective, maybe it is time to consider that 
a new type of Union could provide better value 
for the money invested?  
                                                      
22 K. Raik and H. Ojanen (2013), “European Global Strategy: 
no such in sight, yet”, Finnish Institute of International 
Affairs, 31 May (http://www.fiia.fi/se/blog/415/ 
european_global_strategy_no_such_in_sight_yet/).  
23 See G. Faleg and A. Giovannini (2012), “The EU between 
pooling & sharing and smart defence: Making a virtue of 
necessity?”, CEPS Special Report No. 61, May, p. 22.  
24 See V. Briani (2013), “Armaments duplication in Europe: 
A quantitative assessment”, CEPS Policy Brief No. 297, 16 
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